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1

Introduction

In our daily lives, behaviours are oriented by social norms 1 in diverse situations through
consumption norms, regulation of the use of money, reciprocity or cooperation, and even
work norms (Elster, 1989). To cite only a few examples, conformism 2 and normative
eﬀects appear in working hours, dress code, courtesy rules, waste sorting but also mealtimes. According to Kreps (1997), the fundamentals of these norms are multiple; they
include peer-pressure eﬀects, coordination between agents and lack of costs. Azar (2004)
suggests norms avoiding over-exploitation of the commons.
Avoiding over-exploitation of the commons is of interest, especially for scarce resources
such as water because norms can sustain vicious or virtuous cycles on environmental issues
(Nyborg, 2020). Heterogeneous spatio-temporal repartition of water and conﬂicts of use,
escalating with climate change (Ambec and Dinar, 2010), concern the actual use of water
and generate new challenges. Therefore, to avoid transboundary conﬂicts or more local
distortions, optimisation of water sharing is needed. Game theory researchers have been
exploring the issue by focusing on various types of consumers (farmers, industries, and
households) and territories (Madani, 2010). On cross-border ﬂowing rivers (Ambec and
Sprumont, 2002; Ambec and Ehlers, 2008; Ambec et al., 2013) and on sources (İlkılıç,
2011), the main objective of this theoretical framework is to limit sub-optimal extraction
by reducing the deviations between consumptions and real needs.
Many instruments such as taxes, quotas, or even laws have been implemented to
preserve water, but they are often not eﬃcient enough to prevent overconsumption and
the tragedy of the commons. Barnes et al. (2013) show that sometimes people subject
to regulatory instruments suﬀer not only from an aversion of responsibility and lack
of knowledge on regulative goals but also high resistance to enforced regulation. To
correct these market failures, some authors (Barnes et al., 2013; Schubert, 2017) focus
on the ﬂourishing concept of nudge that can appeal to other-regarding preferences and
1
Many deﬁnitions of social norms exist in the literature (see, for example, Elster (1989) and Kreps
(1997)). In our study, we consider the social norm as the average action of neighbours as in the approach
of Ushchev and Zenou (2020). The last part of this study with extensions of the model raises additional
intuitions on the characterisation of this term.
2
Conformism in this study follows the deﬁnition of Azar (2004), who states that ‘conformist transmission is a tendency to copy the most frequent behaviour in the population, using the popularity of a
choice as an indirect measure of its worth’ (page 50).
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people’s inclination to follow the crowd. Both empirical and theoretical studies have
already emphasised the eﬀects of informational social norm imposed by a regulator on
water consumption (see, for example, Datta et al. (2015)’s study on the inﬂuence of
neighbours consumption’s information on domestic water, Chabe-Ferret et al. (2019)’s
study on farmers with social comparison through smart grid consumption, Earnhart et
al. (2020)’s study on social comparison in wastewater treatment facilities and Ouvrard
and Stenger (2020)’s study on a formalisation of informational social norm incentives).
In addition, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) point out that behaviours can be guided by not
only intrinsic and extrinsic but also reputational motivations, which can backﬁre. For
example, rewards can be low or even negative reinforcers when they exert hidden social
costs (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Moreover, economic incentives can reduce eﬀects of
normative messages (Pellerano et al., 2017). As an example, Chabe-Ferret et al. (2019)
observe a "boomerang" eﬀect with an increase of consumption in low-water consumers.
That is undesirable to preserve the resource.
To avoid the limitations of the regulative approach raised in the previous paragraph,
this study aims to oﬀer a theoretical framework on endogenous social norms in water
extraction games. Let us start with a realistic example to get the intuition. Internalised
norms can play a strong role in reﬁning the preferences of water users. Imagine a group
of farmers whose farms are near to each other, who endure the same periods of drought
or abundance of the resource, who know each other, and who discuss their crops and
irrigation practices. A farmer who waters without measurements during a drought will
be singled out by others. Such a farmer will be exposed to shame, low self-esteem,
embarrassment, and guilt, characteristics of the disapproval of others deﬁned by Elster
(1989). Thus, preferences of water extractors consider the way people look at each other,
coordination between agents, wish to make an eﬀort if others do likewise and so on.
This echoed the quote by Gintis (2003) when the author said, ‘internalized norms are
accepted not as instruments towards and constraints upon achieving other ends, but rather
as arguments in the preference function that the individual maximises’ (page 156).
To our knowledge, endogenous social norms’ eﬀect on water extraction is inadequately
discussed theoretically in the literature. To address this research gap, we bridge three
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academic frameworks: social norms, water extraction games, and network theory. While
we already introduced the ﬁrst two, we now add a few comments on the last one. Network
theory has been widely used in the contribution and the provision of public goods (Allouch,
2015; Bramoullé et al., 2007). As shown by Ballester et al. (2006), some agents can play
a crucial role in behaviours of others and can, in our case, signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
water extraction in the network of water users. Second, this literature can consider linear
complementarity problems with games, including cross-inﬂuences (Ballester and CalvóArmengol, 2010). That is, both substitutabilities and complementarities that appear in
water extraction with social norms can be considered.
More formally, we consider a group of heterogeneous agents in a connected network
with no self-loop links, sharing one common water resource. As in İlkılıç (2011), agents
receive a concave beneﬁt from their extraction such that the ﬁrst units of water are
essential, but as in Ambec and Ehlers (2008), they are also satiable. Additionally, we
rely on İlkılıç (2011) who assumes that agents endorse a convex cost from extraction.
This cost varies with the consumption of others. It introduces substitutabilities between
agents because when one user extracts more, water becomes scarcer and less aﬀordable
for the others, who consequently consume less. The converse is true. Substitutabilities
are sometimes balanced by complementarities coming from normative eﬀects. When an
agent increases (decreases) his or her consumption of water, neighbours will follow this
trend by conformist transmission and also increase (decrease) their extractions. Note that
we consider a descriptive type of norm 3 because, as in the work of Ushchev and Zenou
(2020), norms are induced by the network of relations in itself and generate externalities
on agents who deviate from it.
The rest of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces the model of water
extraction with endogenous social norms. The main result of this study, presented in
section 3, is to establish the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in a model of water extraction that considers endogenous social norms under a suﬃcient condition. This section
also characterises the equilibrium. Afterward, comparative statics is provided on the relationship between individual parameters and global quantity extracted, and the network’s
3

In 1990, Cialdini et al. introduced the distinction between injunctive (what ought to be done) and
descriptive norms (what is done); our study considers the second ones.
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density. When water users are under moral constraint conditions, we obtain apparent
results such as direct positive eﬀects of the amplitude of the beneﬁt and direct negative
eﬀects of cost and density of the network on total consumption. Section 5 discusses social
optimum properties such that water users consider the diﬀusion of their actions in the
whole network. Thus, we consider the social welfare 4 and provide a condition for the Nash
equilibrium to be socially optimal. To avoid sub-optimal water extractions, we discuss
the tragedy of the commons when individual extractions at equilibrium exceed the social
optimum ones. Section 6 extends this model by discussing anti-conformism, formalising
the social norm related to the notion of centrality 5, public implications and regulatory
intervention. We conclude with the main contributions and limitations of the study. The
proofs are provided in the appendix.

2

A model of water extraction

Consider a territory composed of n agents located around a unique common water pool.
The set of agents, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}, shares Q units of water that is the total
amount of water extracted from this source (lake, river, . . . ). Each agent i extracts qi
such that the total quantity of retrieved water is the aggregate of individual consumptions,
that is,
Q=

X

qi .

i∈N

We denote Q−i as the total consumption of all agents except i. Following the work of
Ambec and Ehlers (2008), all agents need at least a minimum subsistence amount of
water; therefore, individual extractions follow a non-negativity constraint. Hence, we
have an interior equilibrium and for all i in N : qi > 0.
As agents are sharing a common pool, they can interact and inﬂuence each other on
water allocation. These interactions comprise the set of links between agents (with no
self-loops links) denoted by L. Agent i and agent j are connected if ij ∈ L exists. More
formally, the undirected and unweighted graph g = {N, L} represents social interactions
4

This deﬁnition is commonly accepted in the literature (Lange, 1942) and has been widely used in
water extraction processes (Ambec and Sprumont, 2002)
5
According to Bloch et al. (2019), a centrality measure is a function c : G(n) → Rn+ where ci (g) is
the centrality of node i in the social network g
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between agents during the water extraction process. The graph includes both a disjoint
set of nodes formed by N agents and a set of links L between them.
Realistically, an agent does not necessarily interact with all others. However, because
they share a common resource, the network is connected and there is no isolated individual. Given the interaction structure, let Ni be the set of neighbours of agent i, that
is,
Ni = {j ∈ N such that ij ∈ L}.
We denote ni as the cardinal of Ni ; that is the number of agents that i interacts with,
such that ni ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N . Moreover, we write Q̄i , the social norm associated to the
quantity extracted by i’s neighbours, such that

Q̄i =

X
j∈Ni

qj
QNi
=
.
ni
ni

Each agent i has a utility function Ui : Rn+ → R given by
Ui = αi qi −

βi 2
δi
qi − γi qi Q − (qi − Q̄i )2 ,
2
2

where αi , βi , γi and δi are strictly positive parameters. Note that agent’s preferences are
heterogeneous because water users do not necessarily have the same needs for the resource.
This function is composed of three parts where the ﬁrst two follow the water extraction
game of İlkılıç (2011) but on a single source. This characterisation follows standard convex
cost and concave beneﬁt functions, widely used in natural resources (Smith, 1968). The
third is a social norm, inspired by the work of Ushchev and Zenou (2020).
First, αi qi −

βi 2
q
2 i

: R+ → R represents i ’s concave beneﬁt associated with the value

of water extraction. The marginal value of extraction is deﬁned by the amplitude of
beneﬁt αi and its depreciating slope βi . Per the incompressible consumption of ﬁrst units
of water, the marginal value for water extraction, which is linear and strictly decreasing
with respect to individual consumption, is high enough to avoid no water consumption
and corner solutions. This speciﬁcation is also consistent with the work of Ambec and
Ehlers (2008), which considers satiable agents, such that after an amount of consumed
water, users suﬀer disutility from additional consumption.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1339
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Second, γi qi Q : R+ → R+ is a strictly convex cost function of extraction that relies
on the total amount of consumed water. The marginal cost γi is deﬁned such that the
price of extraction for an additional unit of water is always more costly than the previous
one. This parameter is suﬃciently low to maintain the cost of water aﬀordable for agents.
Realistically, ﬁrst water units extracted beneﬁt from direct accessibility, better quality, the
abundance of resources, and proximity. Conversely, the more consumption increases, the
more scarce and expensive the resource is due to the lack of accessibility and proximity,
transportation costs, leaks of conveyance, and bad quality. Thus, the convex cost function
is dissuasive and limits the global extraction of water.
Third, the term

δi
(qi
2

− Q̄i )2 represents the endogenised social norm and consequently

the inﬂuence of neighbourhood’s water consumption on the extraction of agent i. Because
water users assume a disutility induced by moral cost to deviate from the norm, they are
inﬂuenced by other-regarding preferences. Parameter δi represents the taste for conformity
of agent i such that δi > 0 and Q̄i is the endogenous social norm that varies according to
the structure of the network. The higher δi is, the more agent i is a conformist and has
a moral constraint to follow the others.

3

Equilibrium properties

In the following section, we introduce the equilibrium properties of the water extraction
game presented in the previous model.

3.1

Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium

Each water user chooses to maximise Ui by taking the network structure of relations and
extractions of other agents on the common water source. All of them face the following
optimisation problem:

max
αi qi −
q
i

δi
βi 2
qi − γi qi Q − (qi − Q̄i )2
2
2

under constraint
qi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021
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Under Nash assumptions, agent i makes his or her own decisions. In contrast, Q−i (quantity of water consumed by all agents except i) and Q̄i are exogenously treated as they
rely on the decisions of other agents. Note that the available extracted amount of water
Q is implicitly limited by the convex cost function, which avoids an inﬁnite quantity.
In this study, matrices are written in upper case and boldface, while vectors in lower
case and boldface. A matrix to the power T denotes its transpose, and I is the notation for
the identity matrix. The maximisation programme of water extractor is associated with
the linear complementarity problem LCP (−α, M), given in the appendix. As shown in
the appendix, if

βi
γi

> n − 3, the interaction matrix M is strictly diagonally dominant and

consequently ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium with q as the vector of individual
water extractions.
Theorem 1. Assume that the following condition holds:
βi
>n−3
γi

for all i ∈ N.

(1)

Then, the water extraction game admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
Several comments on Theorem 1 are in order. First, we do not generalise the results of
İlkılıç (2011), but we consider both positive and negative externalities (complementarities
and substitutabilities, respectively) between agents following the work of Ballester and
Calvó-Armengol (2010).
Second, note that

βi
γi

is an inverse ratio of second derivatives of the costs and ben-

eﬁts associated with water extraction. The second derivative of beneﬁts represents the
marginal will to consume more. The marginal beneﬁt is expected to grow slowly when
the extracted quantity increases. Conversely, the marginal cost is expected to increase
rapidly when the extracted water quantity increases. If the evolution of marginal beneﬁts
is higher than the evolution of marginal costs, consumers extract increasingly more water.
On the contrary, if marginal cost variation is really high, this ratio tends to be low, and
agents extract increasingly less water. The variations of this ratio reﬂect the evolution of
the marginal propensity to consume when the quantity of water extracted varies.
Third, to obtain the unicity of the Nash equilibrium, the agent’s willingness to consume
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has to be high compared to the number of agents. Thus, parameter β for all agents should
balance the number of water extractors included in the network to ensure a suﬃcient
condition. However, this condition is less restrictive than it seems to be because parameter
γi is low. It has to be little enough to avoid the unaﬀordable cost of water. Thus, if this
parameter of cost is low enough, the limits of the ratio tend towards a high value
βi
= ∞.
γi →0 γi
lim

The condition of uniqueness is thus easily satisﬁed because the ratio of propensity to
consume is high and easily exceeds n − 3. It can even happen in really huge networks of
many agents.
Fourth, this condition is suﬃcient but not necessary so that the uniqueness of Nash
equilibrium is not guaranteed only under it. It can also be established in other cases
without this suﬃcient condition. Further, it can open the diversity of possibilities for
other examples of networks. This equilibrium is characterised in the following words.

3.2

Characterisation of Nash equilibrium

We investigate the characterisation of interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium, when all
agents consume at least a minimum vital level of water 6, as in Ambec and Ehlers (2008).
In case of interior solution, the quantity vector of water extractions is given by
q = M−1 α.

However, it is interesting to decompose M to understand all interactions between agents.
The ﬁrst-order condition of utility maximisation for agent i with respect to qi is given
by
∂Ui
= αi − βi qi − γi (qi + Q) − δi (qi − Q̄i ) + µi = 0
∂qi
with µi ≥ 0 and µi qi = 0
where µi is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the positivity constraint
6

A relative condition on parameters such that αi > γi Q−i − δi Q̄i
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on water extraction quantities. Note that the implications induced by social norms in the
model are reﬂected in the ﬁrst-order conditions such that

−δi (qi − Q̄i ) S 0 ⇐⇒ Q̄i S qi .
Thus, in maximising utility, an agent can be in three diverse situations. If (qi − Q̄i ) = 0, it
is similar to a standard maximisation programme without social norm and marginal cost
equalling marginal beneﬁt. If (qi − Q̄i ) > 0 then the beneﬁt has to compensate both the
cost and the disutility of the social norm induced by overconsumption of water. When
(qi − Q̄i ) < 0, then the beneﬁt and social norm externality have to compensate the cost
following a trend of not consuming a lot.
By computing the ﬁrst-order condition of agent i with respect to qi , we express the
best-reply function for each water user as follows:

qi =

αi − γi Q−i + δi Q̄i
βi + 2γi + δi

or equivalently written in matrix form:

q = a − Bq + Cq

where the matrix B represents substitutabilities and C represents neighbourhood’s complementarities. A substitutability eﬀect is induced by the cost of water extraction, which
increases for agent j when i consumes more and vice versa. Conversely, when individuals
inﬂuence each other through peer eﬀects, the social norm acts as a complementarity eﬀect.
By conformity, if individual i increases (or decreases) his or her consumption, his or her
neighbour j will be encouraged to do likewise. Thus, the vector of individual extracted
quantities q is given by the following fact.
Fact 1. Assume condition (1) holds and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then, the unique
Nash Equilibrium is given by
q∗ = [I − (C − B)]−1 a.
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In the following proposition, C > B implies that there exists at least one entry of
matrix C superior to its equivalent entry in B and that all other entries are at least
equal. Let ρ be the spectral radius 7 of a matrix.
Proposition 1. Assume condition (1) holds and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
1. If C > B and ρ(C − B) < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
q∗ =

∞
X

(C − B)k a.

k=0

2. If C < B and ρ(B − C) < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
∗

q =

"∞
X

(B − C)

2k

k=0

−

∞
X

#

(B − C)

2k+1

a.

k=0

A few comments on Proposition 1 are in order. The ﬁrst case is a speciﬁc one as
long as it concerns only complete graphs such that all of the out-of-diagonal terms in the
matrix are composed of social norms and costs. It happens when the society is composed
of strongly conformist agents and when social norms take the lead on cost eﬀects. For
both even and odd paths between agents, the eﬀects on water extraction are positive, and
complementarities introduced by norms exceed the costs. This situation is more plausible
in small networks when everybody knows and talks to each other. In this case, water users
are more likely to inﬂuence their neighbours’ consumption and create spill-over eﬀects.
The second case corresponds to a weak conformist society where the costs assumed
by agents are predominant compared to social norms. Because C < B, the positive
sign associated with the ﬁrst sum implies that the equilibrium extraction from a link is
negatively related to the even links that start from it. These strategic substitutabilities
are coming from costs. Conversely, the negative sign behind the second sum for odd links
induces complementarity eﬀects between nodes that come from the normative conformism
eﬀects. Thus, complementarities are overtaken by substitutabilities induced by costs. This
characterisation of norms highlights an alternance, depending on the degree and number of
walks between the agents. Neighbours connected by an even number of links are inﬂuenced
7

Let us consider an arbitrary matrix M; the spectral radius of this matrix denoted by ρ(M) is given
by the largest modulus of its eigenvalues.
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by strategic substitutabilities, while odd links between agents are more inﬂuenced by the
social norm, which implies strong complementarities. This result highlights the role of
intermediary agents who can balance the eﬀects between non-neighbours.
Remark 1. If we cannot conclude on the predominant eﬀect between substitutabilities
and complementarities for all agents, then we cannot give a global characterisation of q.
Some elements of the matrix alone are non-negative.
Thus, in that case, it depends on the individual but not general conclusions. If an
individual is characterised by a very strong social norm inﬂuence, it will outweigh the
cost. q depends on individual heterogeneous parameters and the positioning within the
network behind the construction of the interaction matrix.
Conditions required in the previous proposition state that spectral radius of matrices
(C − B) and (B − C) (respectively for cases 1 and 2) have to be lower than 1 to follow
the Perron-Frobenius theorem since matrices are non-negative. The highest eigenvalue
increases if the network expands. However, following the Gershgorin theorem, all eigenvalues of the matrix are contained in a circle of radius. This implies that, in the ﬁrst case,
when C > B, the diﬀerential values between complementarities and substitutabilities
are suﬃciently low and complementarities over-compensate the cost. In the second case,
when C < B, the values of substitutabilities are not suﬃciently low to be compensated
by complementarities, but the diﬀerence between the two stays small. Following the work
of Ballester and Calvó-Armengol (2010), the spectral radius is an increasing function of
networks links’ intensity. In the ﬁrst case, all out-of-diagonal terms are composed of both
complementarities and substitutabilities. Each agent is connected to others to make the
network dense and regular. On the contrary, in the second case, the complete network is
a particular case, such that the network is most likely to be less dense and regular and to
have a lower spectral radius.
In conclusion, the eﬀects of norms on water extraction have complex implications.
To avoid sub-optimal consumptions and over-exploitation of the resource, it is necessary
to avoid destructive eﬀects of norms, which lead to an increase in water consumption
and tragedy of the commons. The following section determines the eﬀects of individual
parameters and network’s inﬂuence on the global quantity extracted.
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4

Comparative statics analysis

Relying on comparative statics analysis of the Nash equilibrium, this section aims to
understand the properties of the model through the eﬀects of heterogeneous individual
parameters, conformism, and density of the network on global water extraction.
δi
, which is the moral motivation
In the following results, we consider ei =
βi + γi + δi
of agent i to extract water. This parameter pertains to ]0, 1[ and relies on taste for conformity. A value close to one indicates a highly conformist behaviour under strong moral
constraint. On the contrary, a value close to zero indicates a weak moral constraint induced by other-regarding preferences such that conformism is not prioritised in individual
decisions. In this case, we observe individualist behaviours. Note that as γi is necessarily
low, the value of this moral motivation depends on the relative values of δi and βi . If the
slope of marginal beneﬁt is high, it implies a low moral motivation regarding the others
because individual interests increase and conversely so.

4.1

How individual parameters inﬂuence water extraction

Let us start with the amplitude of beneﬁt αi from water extraction.
Proposition 2. Assume condition (1) holds and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose
the following condition also holds:
X
i∈N1

X ei
ei
= ... =
.
ni
i∈Nn ni

(2)

Then, the change in total water consumption resulting from a change in amplitude of
beneﬁt for any agent i is given by
dQ = σi dαi
where σi > 0.
Before studying the eﬀects of the amplitude of beneﬁt directly, let us discuss the second
condition required for all static comparative results. Condition (2) refers to ponderated
moral motivation that relies on the number of neighbours. For instance, equality between
sums can appear when an individual has more neighbours with a huge moral motivation,
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and another only a few neighbours with a small moral motivation. This equality can
also occur if the moral motivation of agents match and they have the same number
of neighbours (cardinal number of neighbours). Thus, this ratio highlights the moral
motivation with respect to the structure of the neighbourhood in the network of relations.
If this condition does not hold, we cannot conclude. The eﬀect of variations of a parameter
on the total water extraction can be positive, negative, or null.
Remark 2. Suppose that for all agents i in N , the parameter of taste for conformity δi is
null. Then condition (2) always holds because the moral motivation ei for all agents i in
N turns out to be equal to zero.
This remark applies to all propositions of comparative statics. When agents do not
care about the social norm, only condition (1) is required for the following propositions.
Considering the individual amplitude of beneﬁt, we observe a direct positive eﬀect of
a change in this parameter (αi ) on the change in total water consumption. This result is
apparent and intuitive. An increase in the beneﬁt amplitude for an agent will induce an
increase in water consumption and consequently raise the total water extraction.
We now focus on the eﬀect of the slope of marginal beneﬁt βi on extraction outcomes.
Proposition 3. Assume condition (1) and (2) hold, and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, the change in total water consumption resulting from a change of the slope of the
marginal beneﬁt for any agent i is given by
dQ = −σi qi∗ dβi

where σi > 0.
The direct eﬀect of a change in the slope of marginal beneﬁt (βi ) negatively impacts
the change in total water consumption. In the individual utility function, the higher this
slope, the more the value of an additional unit of water is depreciated. Thus, it is intuitive
to notice that a change in this slope induces a direct negative eﬀect on the change in total
water extraction. In addition, note that this negative eﬀect increases with the value of
extracted water at equilibrium for an agent i. The more agent i extracts at equilibrium,
the more a change in the slope of marginal beneﬁt will impact the total water extraction.
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1339
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An agent i with a high level of consumption can signiﬁcantly impact the total water
extracted.
Now we look at the impact of the cost eﬀect on individual and global water extraction.
Proposition 4. Assume condition (1) and (2) hold, and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, the change in total water consumption resulting from a change of the slope of
marginal cost for any agent i is given by
dQ = −σi (Q∗ + qi∗ ) dγi

where σi > 0.
Under linear mapping simpliﬁcation of moral constraints, the direct price eﬀect of
a small change in the slope of marginal cost (γi ) negatively impacts the total water
consumption. This result seems logical insofar as a variation in the slope of the marginal
cost will have an impact on the direct beneﬁt derived by agent i from water consumption.
The higher the cost of an additional unit of water, the less incentive an individual will
have to extract water. Furthermore, this change in total water extraction is positively
impacted by the quantity extracted at equilibrium by agent i and the entire structure of
the network of water users. The cost of ﬁrst water units is lower because it beneﬁts from
direct accessibility, proximity, and availability of the resource. Thus, if the individual
quantity of any agent i and the general quantity extracted at equilibrium increase, it
ampliﬁes the negative direct eﬀect of a variation of the slope of marginal beneﬁt on the
total water extraction, leading to a direct negative impact of a change in the slope of the
marginal cost on the change in the total water extraction.
This expected negative direct price eﬀect on global quantity should, however, be discussed more extensively. If moral constraints do not follow condition (2), a more complex
mechanism of interactions can arise and can be decomposed in the following steps:
• A direct negative impact of an increase in the price for one agent decreases his or
her consumption and, consequently, the global quantity.
• Neighbours of this agent have an incentive to follow this line and also decrease their
water consumption because of conformity to the norm.
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• However, if many agents decrease their consumption, water will be more accessible
and cost less.
• This reduction of cost and water accessibility encourages agents, even the ﬁrst agent
previously impacted by the cost eﬀect, to increase their consumption.
Thus, depending on the predominant eﬀect, a price increase can also lead to more consumption. This eﬀect of cost should be treated cautiously.

4.2

Does a conformist society extract more water?

This subsection focuses on the eagerness of taste for conformity δi on individual and global
outcomes of water extraction.
Proposition 5. Assume condition (1) and (2) hold, and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, the change in the total water consumption resulting from a change of the taste for
conformity for any agent i is given by




dQ = σi Q̄∗i − qi∗ dδi

where σi > 0.
The change in taste for conformity for any agent i impacts the change in the total water
consumption in two ways that induce an ambiguous eﬀect. This direct eﬀect is positively
related to the value of the social norm of agent i. A change in taste for conformity
– for instance, an individual i is more conformist – induces a positive change in the
total water extraction that is ampliﬁed through the value of his or her social norm.
A high social norm, by conformity, will incentivise individual i to increase his or her
consumption. With peer eﬀects, it is the total quantity of consumed water that will
increase. Conversely, the change in taste for conformity induces a negative direct eﬀect
of the total water consumption directly related to individual extraction of agent i at
equilibrium. The higher the individual extraction of agent i, the higher the negative
impact of a change of his or her taste for conformity on total water extraction. Thus, this
ambiguous eﬀect of taste for conformity oﬀers two conﬁgurations. The ﬁrst one occurs if
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∗

the social norm of agent i exceeds the agent’s consumption at equilibrium (Q̄i − qi∗ > 0).
A change of taste for conformity induces a positive change in the total water extraction.
Agents want to conform more to the norm due to the variation in the taste for conformity
and imitate others, thus raising the total consumption. The second conﬁguration occurs
if the individual consumption of agent i exceeds his or her social norm at equilibrium
∗

(Q̄i − qi∗ < 0) and induces a negative change on the total water extraction. Here, the
change in taste for conformity negatively aﬀects the total water extraction because user i
is a huge water extractor. If the agent increases his or her taste for conformity, he or she
will follow others, thus reducing his or her extraction and consequently the global one.

4.3

Do users extract more water in denser networks?

In this section, we investigate how the creation or the deletion of a link between two
network agents inﬂuences water extraction.
Proposition 6. Assume condition (1) and (2) hold, and let qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, the change in total water consumption resulting from the addition or the deletion
of a link between any two agents i and j is given by
ei ∗
ej
Q̄i dni + Q̄∗j dnj
dQ = −σ
ni
nj

!

where σ > 0.
This proposition shows that in any network, we can observe a negative eﬀect of a
change in the network’s density on the total water consumption. This negative eﬀect
increases with the respective moral motivations of agents i and j denoted by ei and ej ,
but also by their respective social norm values at equilibrium. The more their neighbours
extract the resource, and they have a moral motivation to follow them, the more the
direct negative eﬀect of a change in density on total water extraction is important. On the
contrary, if the cardinal number of neighbours for i and j is high and agents are much more
connected, this direct negative eﬀect would be less important. This is understandable
because if they are already a lot of links in the network, the creation or the deletion of
one link will only have a slight eﬀect on the total water extraction.
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We studied the eﬀects of individual parameter variation, conformism strength, and
density of the network on the total water consumption. The following section provides
more details on how agents can reach a social optimum conﬁguration.

5

Welfare and social optimum properties

We now analyse social optimum properties in the case of interior solutions. In this study,
we consider social welfare denoted by W as the sum of individual utilities given by:

W =

X

Ui .

i=1,2,...,n

Here, social welfare represents the aggregated satisfaction of agents coming from their
extraction of water. Thus, the maximisation problem of society’s welfare from water
extraction is given by

max
q
i

n
X
i=1

"

βi
δi
αi qi − qi2 − γi qi Q − (qi − Q̄i )2
2
2

#

s.t. qi > 0, for all i in N .
The next proposition introduces a characterisation of the ﬁrst best extraction of water.
It also provides a condition for the Nash equilibrium to be the ﬁrst best.
Proposition 7 (First best). Let qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then,
1. For each agent i, the ﬁrst best extraction of water qio is a solution to

qi =

αi − γi Q−i + δi Q̄i −

P
j̸=i

γj qj +

P

δk
k∈Ni nk (qk

− Q̄k )

βi + 2γi + δi

or, in a matrix form,
q = a − Bq + Cq − Nq.
2. If condition (1) holds and qi∗ > 0 for all i = . . . , n, the unique Nash equilibrium is
socially optimal, i.e., q∗ = qo , if and only if the following condition holds:
N [I − (C − B)]−1 a = 0.
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Part 1 of this proposition highlights the diﬀerence between Nash equilibrium and
optimum best answer. Compared to the Nash equilibrium, this ﬁrst best answer has
two additional terms, also represented by the addition of the N matrix. With social
optimum, agents care about the diﬀusion of their inﬂuence in the network on the choices
of others. The ﬁrst additional term, denoted by

P

γj qj represents the negative impact

j̸=i

of cost induced by others’ extraction from the common pool. The higher this sum of
individual costs assumed by others is, the lesser the amount of water individual i extracts
at social optimum. The second additional term, denoted by

P δk
k∈Ni

nk

(qk − Q̄k ), corresponds

to the social norms deviations of all neighbours of agent i. For each agent k that is a
neighbour of agent i, it sums the deviation between k’s extraction and his or her respective
social norm, ponderated by his or her taste for conformity. Thus, two conﬁgurations
appear. First, if (qk − Q̄k ) is positive, for instance, agent k extracts more than the mean
consumption of his or her neighbours, the quantity extracted by agent i is positively
impacted. As k is part of i’s neighbourhood, if his or her consumption is high, agent
i will have an incentive to do likewise. Secondly, if (qk − Q̄k ) is negative, for instance,
agent k extracts less than the mean consumption of his or her neighbours, it will impact
negatively the quantity extracted by i at social optimum. Agent i will get closer to his
or her neighbours and thus decrease consumption to follow this line. This last term is a
sum of

δk
(q
nk k

− Q̄k ) across all neighbours of agent i. Thus, some neighbours can be in the

ﬁrst conﬁguration and others in the second one. One eﬀect of this social norm prevails
on the other and inﬂuences positively or negatively the ﬁrst best extraction at optimum.
We also observe a snowball eﬀect from the indirect social norm because this eﬀect relies
on the social norms of neighbours and thus two degrees connections from i, going by the
intermediary of k.
In conclusion, at the Nash equilibrium, when agents decide their best level of water
extraction, they do not consider the positive or negative externalities induced by their
extraction on others’ satisfaction. On the contrary, at social optimum’s ﬁrst best, agents
consider costs assumed by others and their inﬂuence through direct and indirect social
norms. The focus on society’s welfare implies that each individual’s choice of water
consumption depends on his or her impact on the rest of water extractors through con-
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sumption costs, and direct and indirect norms of the others. For instance, in a group
of domestic consumers or farmers, it implies that people will care about others, show
altruism to ensure that everybody can aﬀord some water, and care about other-regarding
preferences and self-image.
The second part of proposition 8 provides a condition on the matrix such that the
extraction quantities at the Nash equilibrium are identical to those extracted at social
optimum. This condition relies on the matrix N, which introduces the consideration of
others’ utility in the maximisation problem. It needs precise parameters adequation and
could thus be uncommon to hold. Still, water extractors can reach the vector of individual
extracted quantities at the social optimum q, given by the following Fact 2. It not only
relies both complementarities C and substitutabilities B but also on N, which represents
interactions induced by the consideration of society’s welfare.
Fact 2. Let qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Then, the social optimum is given by
qo = [I − (C − B) + N]−1 a.

To respect individual social welfare and implement a fair division of the resource,
over-exploitation by some water users must be avoided. Otherwise, as they all extract
on a single shared resource, it can lead to a tragedy of the commons that deteriorates
the water resource. The deﬁnition of the tragedy of the commons introduced by Hardin
(1968) is taken in its strong sense, meaning that all agents over-extract from the common
water pool. Thus, for all agents i in N , the individual extraction at equilibrium exceeds
the one at social optimum. For instance,
q∗ >> qo .

The following proposition states a condition for the tragedy of the commons to hold.
Proposition 8 (Tragedy of the commons). Assume condition (1) holds. Let qi∗ > 0 and
qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. If C > B, ρ(C − B) < 1 and the following condition holds:
X

γj qjo −

j∈N \{i}
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then, in equilibrium, each agent overconsumes water compared to the ﬁrst best.
Remark 3. Consider that condition (3), in the previous proposition, is reversed such
that the diﬀerence between the two sums is negative. Then, in equilibrium, each agent
underconsumes water compared to the ﬁrst best.
This proposal considers all agents that form the extraction network, with positive
extractions at (unique) equilibrium and social optimum. We observe a tragedy of the
commons when condition 3 applies to all of them. This condition requires that for each
agent i, the diﬀerence between the sum of costs assumed by all agents except i ponderated
by their optimal individual quantity of extraction and the weighted sum of the diﬀerences
for each of his or her neighbours between their equilibrium quantity and their social norm
is positive. In this case, agent i overconsumes. Doing the same for all agents i, we
obtain that all of them overconsume at an individual scale, and thus a tragedy of the
commons in a strong sense occurs. Tragedy of the commons is an usual outcome of water
extraction games and natural resources (Hardin, 1968; İlkılıç, 2011). However, proposition
8 requires that complementarities underpass substitutabilities, which can happen only in
complete graphs. In case of B > C we cannot generalize the results. Thus, some agents
overconsume and some others underconsume water. This under-consumption may be due,
for example, to a lack of suitable agricultural infrastructure for farmers, or to hanchored
consumption habits for households. It therefore takes time to adapt these consumptions to
real needs. Now that we have discussed welfare and consumption optimality, the following
section extends our model.

6
6.1

Extensions
Anti-conformism

This extension follows the model settings of Ushchev and Zenou (2020) where the social
norm is ponderated by the taste of conformity of agents. We now consider anti-conformists
behaviours of water extractors such that δi < 0 represents the taste for non-conformity.
The amplitude of this parameter indicates the will of an agent to distinguish himself
or herself from others. For instance, this can happen when individuals have strong,
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anchored habits in water consumption or even when keeping a good self-image when they
do not consume a lot. Instead of complementarities, the social norm here acts now as
substitutabilities. Thus, when a neighbour of agent i increases his or her consumption of
water, agent i has an incentive to decrease his or her consumption and deviate from the
norm.
Proposition 9. Assume condition (1) holds and let δi < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Suppose
that the following condition also holds:

βi + 2γi > −δi

for all i ∈ N.

Then, the water extraction game admits a unique Nash equilibrium.
As long as agents are not too anti-conformists, our model with a unique Nash equilibrium can be extended to the case of non-conformity. Thus, we observe higher diﬀerences
between individual extraction, as homophily is not the rule anymore. The relative value
of taste for non-conformity (δi ) has to be suﬃciently low compared to βi . Otherwise, we
cannot prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium. In the case of slightly non-conformist
agents, most of the equilibrium analysis still holds, but it implies new interpretations of
the results. For instance, equilibrium’s best-reply function (given in part 3.2) states that
agent i’s consumption relies positively on the amplitude of individual beneﬁt, which is
now balanced both by cost and social norm. When others extract more, i will extract less
to deviate from others and avoid unaﬀordable costs.
One major concern of this extension compared to the approach of Ushchev and Zenou
(2020) is that the complementarities induced by cost eﬀects included in individual decisions are even accentuated with these anti-conformists behaviours. Non-conformity acts
as a reinforcer of cost-eﬀectiveness. When an agent i increases his or her consumption,
his or her neighbour j will be doubly inﬂuenced to decrease his or her consumption: both
because the cost of water increases due to scarcity and deviates from the behaviour of i.
More generally, degrees of conformism can have a really strong inﬂuence on water
consumption. To discuss it further, we can distinguish four main situations and make a
parallel with the approach of norms of Schultz et al. (2007) who distinguish constructive,
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destructive, and reconstructive eﬀects of norms. The ﬁrst one occurs when an individual
i, a less-water-consumer, increases his or her extraction to get closer to others, weakening
the water resource. This is deﬁned by Schultz et al. (2007) as the destructive eﬀect of
norms. Another situation happens when individual i is a conformist and a high consumer
among low ones. In this situation, we observe a constructive eﬀect such that the agent will
decrease his or her extraction to get close to the others, preserving more of the resource.
A third situation considers an anti-conformist agent i in a high consumer group that
will have an incentive to consume less water quantity to deviate from the others. This
eﬀect is a reconstructive one. The last situation occurs when a non-conformist agent is
among less-water-consumers and is incentivised to increase his or her consumption, as
a free rider behaviour. In this situation, i enjoys aﬀordability and disponibility of the
resource given that others do not extract a lot on the common resource. This elicitation
on various situations and eﬀects of conformism show that it could play a strong role in
the preservation of water resources.

6.2

Reference consumption

This extension presents two diﬀerent situations in which the reference consumption is
not the social norm anymore but a ponderated one. In the ﬁrst situation, agents have
an incentive to behave virtuously and tend towards a lower consumption than the norm.
The second situation is the opposite of the ﬁrst. Agents have an incentive to free-ride and
beneﬁt from extracting more than the social norm. In our case, adding a ponderation on
the social norm will not signiﬁcantly change the results and demonstration of the Nash
equilibrium’s uniqueness except that it introduces a parameter behind social norm in the
disutility of agents to diverge from the norm.
To address this issue, let us extend the utility function of agents such that Ui : Rn+ → R
is given by
U i = αi q i −

δi
βi 2
qi − γi qi Q − (qi − λi Q̄i )2 ,
2
2

where 0 < λi < 1 is the reference ponderation factor of the norm for agent i in the
ﬁrst situation. The reference consumption is thus lower than his or her social norm
consumption. In the second situation, λi > 1 such that the reference consumption is
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higher than the social norm consumption. Note that in the case of λi = 1, we note no
diﬀerence from our standard model.
Characterisation of the equilibrium includes a ponderation from the reference consumption. It slightly modiﬁes the results. However, as this ponderation is positive and
only ponderates complementarities, the equilibrium consumptions follow the same lines
as above. Thus, best-reply-function for each individual i at equilibrium is now given by

qi =

αi − γi Q−i + λi δi Q̄i
βi + 2γi + δi

Equivalently written in matrix form :

q = a − Bq + ΛCq
where Λ is a dimension n × n matrix such that

λi,j =






0

for i = j or for (i ̸= j and j ∈
/ Ni )





λi

for i ̸= j and j ∈ Ni .

The matrix M stays a P-Matrix with a positive ponderation on the norm that can
inﬂuence up or down the reference consumption. It follows the same line of proof of
Theorem 1, but this time with a λi parameter before the taste for conformity that still
ensures the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Depending on whether λi is lower or higher than one, interpretations of the results
are slightly modiﬁed as deﬁned for each case in the following words.

6.2.1

When agents follow injunctive norms

Our model focuses on what is done by others (descriptive norm) but not on what must be
done (injunctive one). However, the literature shows that it can be interesting to combine
both of them (Le Coent et al., 2021). People know that water is an important and scarce
resource that has to be preserved. Thus, it seems realistic to assume that agents may be
incentivised to diminish their consumption for environmental motivation. To discuss this
point, we introduce a reference consumption that people could follow and that is lower
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than what their neighbours are doing. In this ﬁrst case, agents are thus incentivised to
follow a lower reference than the social norms of neighbours.
This inﬂuences the interpretation of the model. In the best-reply function with ponderation of social norm, compared to the standard model, the positive impact of the social
norm on individual consumption (given by λi δi Q̄i ) is depreciated. It encourages less i to
consume water. More generally, the matrix Λ weights down each of the existing complementarities introduced by social norm. It guides towards a low consumption of water,
which is seen as beneﬁcial for the preservation of the resource.
Thus, based on a reference consumption point, this extension details the case when
individuals, for ecological reasons, have an incentive to diminish their water consumption
and preserve the resource, following an implicit injunctive norm.

6.2.2

When agents free-ride

This part follows the same line as the previous, but it takes the opposite direction and
focuses on free-riding behaviours (see Grossman et al. (1993) for an empirical example of
such behaviours). It follows the approach of Ushchev and Zenou (2020), who studied the
ambition of agents. In our case, as we focus on the water, it corresponds to a situation in
which agents may beneﬁt from extracting more water than the average consumption of
their neighbours. If all agents extract little, water would still be aﬀordable for an agent
i who would have an incentive to consume a lot and even to overexploit the resource
without paying exorbitant costs in exchange.
The reference consumption of agents is now ampliﬁed and exceeds the mean value of
neighbours’ consumption. In the best-reply function, with over ponderation of the social
norm, the positive impact of the social norm on individual consumption (λi δi Q̄i ) is high
and encourages i to consume more water.
More generally, the matrix Λ weighs up individual consumption of water as it incentivises to exceed social norm’s consumption of water. It induces over-exploitation
and free-riding behaviours, which are problematic for the preservation of the resource.
Thus, this second situation details free-riding eﬀects when agents do not fairly exploit the
resource and do not bear a cost commensurate with the degradation of the resource.
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To conclude on this extension, we show that the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
persists when we change upwards or downwards the normative reference point. In the ﬁrst
case, people tend to decrease their consumption compared to the norm for environmental
reasons. In the second case, agents beneﬁt from the access to water at a low cost. They
have an incentive to deviate from the norm to increase their consumption at an aﬀordable
price, overexploiting the resource.

6.3

Characterisation of social norms

Until now, we have focused on social norms as the mean value of neighbours. Mean
value norms have been widely used in the academic literature (Ushchev and Zenou, 2020)
and also in experimental ﬁelds (Bernedo et al., 2014; Datta et al., 2015). However, this
measurement presents limitations. First, only direct neighbours with one-degree connection reference the social norm. The diﬀusion process and positioning in the complete
architecture of the extraction network is neglected. Secondly, we notice a smoothing of
consumptions of neighbours brieﬂy discussed by Ushchev and Zenou (2020) following a
study on graduates. The mean value of the norm does not reﬂect variations between
consumers and provides smoothed incentives for agents. For instance, in France, people
use approximately 150 litres of tap water each day. However, this mean value could be
composed of consumers who extract 130 and 170 litres or 100 and 200 litres. The last
two situations will provide the same social norm while the reality of consumption is very
diﬀerent. Thirdly, mean value norm points the ﬁnger only on huge consumers while it
can be interesting to consider relative performance to target all of them (Brent et al.,
2020). To palliate these limitations, this extension oﬀers various suggestions to adapt
norm’s measurement. For more salience, we discuss the eﬀects of each speciﬁcation with
examples on four agents. Our discussion allows covering a huge diversity of social network
structures. Circular (G1), complete (G2), linear (G3), irregular (G4), and star networks
(G5) are represented in the following ﬁgures.
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Figure 5: Star graph
6.3.1

Social norm based on variance

We ﬁrst suggest a representation of social norm based on variance with other water extractors such that

P

Q̄i =

i̸=j

(qj − qi )2
ni

.

To consider all variations between agent i’s consumption and his or her neighbours’ consumption, variance catches more variability and does not suﬀer from the smoothing of
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consumptions reproached to mean values.
Here, if an agent deviates upwards or downwards from his or her neighbours’ quantity,
he or she is subject to externalities from non-conformity. Thus the disutility induced by
variations (both upwards or downwards) leads to homophily between agents who want to
conform to the others.
The application of such a norm on an example with four agents is provided in the
appendix. This norm palliates to the smoothing of variability between consumptions of
water but still does not consider the global structure of the network. A third measure
aims to correct the limit by introducing some weak ties in normative eﬀects.

6.3.2

Strength of weak ties on water consumption

Developed by Granovetter (1973), the concept of strength of weak ties relies on the importance of intermediary agents and central positions of individuals. Torres and Carlsson
(2018) show that direct eﬀects of social information on water savings are coupled with
spill-over eﬀects on untargeted agents and that there is a strong diﬀusion of social incentives among people. In their paper, Minato et al. (2010) study the management of lands
and natural resources in a changing rural community and highlight that ‘key players in the
community have many connections and a strong inﬂuence to initiate (or resist) change’
(page 399). They discuss the central position of some agents (due to seniority, knowledge,
roles,...) in diﬀusion processes and their strong inﬂuence on natural resource management.
This approach considers both inﬂuential and peripheral stakeholders. There is a trend to
get close to popular and central ones. To preserve water, these key agents should adopt
virtuous behaviours for the resource, expecting that others will follow them and reduce
waste.
Herewith, we develop another measurement of the social norm, which takes roots in
the eigenvector centrality deﬁned by Bonacich (1972). The centrality of the node i is
proportional to the sum of centralities of neighbours of this node, considering weak ties
for each water extractor. Consequently, this measurement of norms depends on indirect
neighbours with a degree connection equal to or higher than one. For instance, we can
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state that

P

nj q j

i̸=j

Q̄i = P

nj

, ∀j ∈ Ni

i̸=j

where we divide the quantity ponderated by j’s degree centrality for each j by the cardinal
of j’s neighbours for all agents. This characterisation of the norm allows considering a
centrality of two degrees.
The application of such a norm on an example with four agents is given in the appendix.
It shows that in regular networks, these norms are equal to the mean value because all
agents have an identical degree of centrality n − 1. In addition, on an irregular network,
there is a stronger inﬂuence of closely connected neighbours because their centrality and
popularity are higher. To complete this measurement, we can suppress the constraint
that j is in Ni .
6.3.3

Closeness of social norms in the complete network

Another measurement of a social norm that we would like to discuss relies on the paper
of Datta et al. (2015), which shows that city comparison involves fewer eﬀects than the
neighbourhood one. These low eﬀects come from the lack of proximity between agents
in the ﬁrst case. A more recent ﬁeld study based on the reduction of shower time in the
context of water scarcity was conducted by Lede (2019). This study shows empirically
that ingroup norm appeals are more eﬀective than general ones because social identity to
the closest group is stronger. Theoretically, this idea is deﬁned by a social norm where
the water extraction process of agent i is guided by the choices of all the agents who
compose the connected network but also length of paths between them. It takes roots in
the closeness and Katz Bonacich’s centrality measurements (Katz, 1953; Bonacich, 1987).
The closeness’ centrality is based on distances in the network between one node and
another such that a high score induces a low centrality. Herewith, we consider that the
more the distance between node i and another node is high, the lower is its inﬂuence on i’s
water consumption. This following characterisation of centrality also presents similitudes
with the Katz Bonacich (1953, extended in 1987) centrality, which states that centrality
relies on the number of walks from node i and their length. We could imagine a calculation
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of the norm such that

P

δj qj

i̸=j

Q̄i = P

δj

i̸=j

for all j in N so that the higher the length between i and j, the less δj is important. We
consider all j of N , that is, the complete structure of the network.
The application of this kind of norm on an example with four agents is given in the
appendix. Let us reconsider our examples of four agents. In all cases, as the social norm
considers the entirety of the network, for all j in N: Q̄j =

δk qk +δl ql +δm qm
δk +δl +δm

but what diﬀers

is the value of all δ parameters, which would be higher for closer neighbours. Note that
when we consider a complete graph, the length between all agents is the same, and thus
social norm measurement is equivalent to a simple mean norm over all the graphs.

6.3.4

General comments

If we consider a complete graph, some similarities between kinds of norms appear. Various
reasons can explain them. First, the number of connections of each agent is identical and
equals to n − 1, that is, the total number of agents except the one referred to. Thus, it
follows that for all i in N , ni = nj = |Ni | = n − 1. Moreover, in a complete graph, all
agents are directly connected to each other such that for all i in N , QNi =

P

qj . In this

i̸=j

special case of a complete graph,
P

P

nj qj

δj q j

QNi
i̸=j
i̸=j
= P
= P
=
ni
nj
δj
i̸=j

P

qj ∆ j

i̸=j

ni

i̸=j

P

QNi
⇐⇒
=
n−1

i̸=j

(n − 1)qj

(n − 1)2

However, a complete graph is scarce in reality except in small networks and towns
where all agents know each other. In this case, only peer comparison can apply to everybody in the city on water consumption. To compare the previous norm calculations, the
following table oﬀers a summary:
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Implications on water extraction

Mean
value

Variance

31

Strength of
weak ties

Closeness
social
norms

In a group of high consumers,
there is a destructive eﬀect (high
consumption) and contrarily a
constructive eﬀect in a group of
low consummers.
Homophily between agents to
decrease the desutility of nonconformism

Importance of intermediary and
central agents. If key agents are
virtuous, it decreases water consumption, otherwise it results in
overconsumption
Proximity between agents higher
their inﬂuences on each other. Individuals follow close neighbours
and if they are low consumers, it
decreases consumption.

Main characteristics

QNi
Q̄i =
ni

P

Q̄i =

i̸=j

(qj − qi )2

Associated
centrality
measure
Degree centrality

Part of the network included

Limits

Direct relations
(one
degree
links)

Incomplete network that do
not consider global consumption and smoothing of
inﬂuences from neighbours

Degree centrality

Direct relations
(one
degree
links)

Incomplete network that
does not consider global
structure of extraction

Eigenvector
centrality

links
Indirect
and intermediary (two degrees
links)

Structure of network limited to some indirect links.
On regular networks it is as
mean value so it smoothes
inﬂuences.

Closeness
and Katz
Bonacich
centrality
measures

Complete
work

If close neighbours are high
consumers it inﬂuences others to follow overconsumption

ni

P

nj qj

i̸=j

Q̄i = P

nj

i̸=j

P

δj q j

i̸=j

Q̄i = P
i̸=j

δj

net-

Table 1: Synthesis of norms
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7

Concluding comments

This study analyses impacts of social norms in a model of water extraction where heterogeneous agents share a single common resource. As proposed by İlkılıç (2011), individual
utility functions are composed of a concave beneﬁt of extraction and a convex cost, which
relies on others’ consumption. To reﬁne these preferences, we add social norms and otherregarding considerations using the term of taste for conformity inspired by Ushchev and
Zenou (2020). The main result of this study is to establish the uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium under a suﬃcient condition. As in Ushchev and Zenou (2020), this result
holds when agents are slightly anti-conformist. The result allows considering various situations. Conformism occurs when agents care about peer-pressure eﬀects, fairness of water
sharing, homophily, and trends eﬀect. It also allows considering small deviations from
the norm because of anchored habits of consumption, self-image, or even free-riding behaviours. Thus, this model oﬀers an operational framework to study equilibrium water
consumption.
Afterward, the study provides comparative statics analysis to understand the eﬀects
of individual parameters and global consumption of water. Some intuitive conclusions
include the positive direct eﬀect of an increase in amplitude extraction value on the global
extraction or a direct negative eﬀect from an increase in the price. However, some eﬀects
concerning the taste for conformity are more ambiguous. This echoes the literature on
social norms, which highlights constructive, reconstructive, or destructive eﬀects (Schultz
et al., 2007). More speciﬁcally, in the case of water, ambiguity can also come from
geographical delimitation where proximity often encourages the collective reduction of
water consumption (Datta et al., 2015).
As water is a scarce but necessary good, this study also oﬀers insights into social welfare
and optimal water consumption. Water users consider the impacts of their consumptions
on others’ satisfaction and spill-over eﬀects of norms. Additionally, we provide a condition
for the Nash equilibrium to be socially optimal and avoid the tragedy of the commons.
Investigation is crucial to preserve the resource.
As the eﬀects of the norm and peer pressure can strongly impact people’s behaviour,
the last part oﬀers extensions of this model to discuss any situations, such as, when some
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individuals turn to be anti-conformists or free riders. In addition, norm incentives have
been widely seen as mean values of neighbours’ consumption in the academic literature
(Ushchev and Zenou, 2020) and also in experimental ﬁelds (Bernedo et al., 2014; Datta et
al., 2015). However, these norms based on mean value have limitations. Hence, this study
also discusses formalising these standards and shows how they can inﬂuence water consumption, and discusses other types of norm measurements. Here, we deliberately focus
on endogenous social norms as they are inadequately studied elsewhere in water theoretical frameworks. However, this discussion on formalising norms also oﬀers interesting
patterns for exogenous norms (for instance, the information provided by a regulator).
Some types of social norms are more appropriate to target other types of consumers.
This study also raises other research questions. First, the endogenous structure of
the graph stems from the consideration of water resources and the domestic extraction
process. In real life, people do not choose their living place or farming area depending on
the water extraction of their neighbours but mainly on other criteria. Thus, the network
in itself is already imposed on people and consequently, at least partly, on the social
norm. However, an external regulation from public authorities or water ﬁrms can play
a crucial role and generate links to raise collective awareness among water users. An
additional regulatory intervention could inﬂuence the network structure with incentives,
taxes, and connections to avoid sub-optimal consumptions. The second perspective of
research is open on the formalisation of norms. This study focuses on descriptive norms,
but injunctive ones could also be appropriate. There is a common awareness regarding
the need to preserve the resource and consume sustainably. This goes hand-in-hand with
further research on complementarity between normative incentives and other regulative
tools. A third limitation to the study is that it focuses on theoretical aspects of the
model. It could be interesting to also try applying the model with empirical simulations
and agent based models to provide new insights into endogenous norms in networks.
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Appendix

The ﬁrst order conditions deﬁne the following linear complementarity problem (Cottle et
al., 2009). For all i = 1, . . . , n, the problem is to ﬁnd an extraction qi ≥ 0 which satisﬁes
the system












h



 αi

qi ≥ 0
αi − βi qi − γi (qi + Q) − δi (qi − Q̄i ) ≤ 0
i

− βi qi − γi (qi + Q) − δi (qi − Q̄i ) qi = 0

or equivalently, ﬁnd a vector q ∈ Rn+ which satisﬁes the system
















q≥0
−α + Mq ≥ 0
qT (−α + Mq) = 0

where α = [αi ]n×1 ∈ Rn+ and M = [mi,j ]n×n is such that









mi,j

βi + 2γi + δi
∂Ui
δ
=−
=  γi − i
∂qi ∂qj 
ni






for i = j
for i ̸= j and j ∈ Ni
for j ̸= i and j ∈
/ Ni .

γi

Let LCP(−α, M) denote the above linear complementarity problem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Following Cottle et al. (2009, Theorem 3.3.7), the LCP(−α, M)
admits a unique solution if M is a P -matrix. A suﬃcient condition is that M be a strictly
diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal entries (Berman and Plemmons, 1994,
Theorem 2.3, p.134). The matrix M is said to be strictly diagonally dominant if

mi,i >

n
X

|mi,j | for all i ∈ N.

j∈N \{i}

Since βi /γi > n − 3, it holds that
βi + 2γi + δi > (n − 1) |γi | + ni −
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By the triangle inequality property of the absolute value, it holds that
δi
δi
≥ γi −
ni
ni
δi
δi
≥ ni γi −
⇐⇒ ni |γi | + ni −
ni
ni
δi
δi
⇐⇒ ni −
≥ ni γi −
− ni |γi |
ni
ni
|γi | + −

for all i ∈ N.

It follows that
δi
− ni |γi |
ni
δi
for all i ∈ N.
= (n − ni − 1) |γi | + ni γi −
ni

βi + 2γi + δi > (n − 1) |γi | + ni γi −

Thus, M is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal entries, and
uniqueness is established.

Proof of Fact 1. Since qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the LCP (−α, M) reduces to
−α + Mq = 0 ⇐⇒ q = M−1 α
where M−1 exists since M is a P -matrix. Hence, the ﬁrst order conditions yield

qi =

αi − γi Q−i + δi Q̄i
βi + 2γi + δi

for all i ∈ N,

or equivalently,
q = a − Bq + Cq ⇐⇒ q∗ = [I − (C − B)]−1 a
where a = [αi /(βi + 2γi + δi )]n×1 , B = [bi,j ]n×n is such that





bi,j = 
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and C = [ci,j ]n×n is such that





ci,j =





0

for i = j or for (i ̸= j and j ∈
/ Ni )

δi
βi + 2γi + δi

for i ̸= j and j ∈ Ni .

Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. Since C − B is nonnegative and ρ(C − B) < 1, it holds
that C − B is convergent (Berman and Plemmons, 1994, Lemma 2.1, p.133). Hence,
[I − (C − B)]−1 exists and
q∗ = [I − (C − B)]−1 a =

∞
X

(C − B)k a.

k=0

Part 2. Since B − C is nonnegative and ρ(B − C) < 1, it holds that B − C is convergent,
so (B − C)2 is also convergent. 8 Hence, [I − (B − C)2 ]−1 exists and
h

i
2 −1

I − (B − C)

=

∞
X

(B − C)2k .

k=0

Furthermore, it holds that
[I + (B − C)] [I − (B − C)] = [I − (B − C)2 ]
I + (B − C) = [I − (B − C)2 ] [I − (B − C)]−1

⇐⇒

[I + (B − C)]−1 = [I − (B − C)2 ]

⇐⇒

−1

[I − (B − C)] .

Hence,
q∗ = [I + (B − C)]−1 a =

∞
X

(B − C)2k [I − (B − C)] a,

k=0

that is,
∗

q =

"∞
X

(B − C)

2k

−

k=0

∞
X

#

(B − C)

2k+1

a.

k=0

Proof of Proposition 2. Totally diﬀerentiating i’s best-response function (while keeping
8

By Gelfand’s Formula, it holds that ρ((B − C)2 ) ≤ ρ(B − C)ρ(B − C) < 1.
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dβi = dγi = dδi = dni = 0) yields
1
γi
δi /ni
dαi −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
1
γi
δi /ni
=
dαi −
dQ +
dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
1
γi
ei
=
dαi −
dQ + dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni

dqi =

Then, summing across all i,
X

(

γi
ei
1
dαi −
dQ + dQNi
dQ =
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi +)δi
ni
i∈N (
X
1
ei
= k
dαi + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N
where
k = 1+

X
i∈N

γi
βi + γi + δi

)

!−1

∈ (0, 1).

Let dαi ̸= 0 for one agent i and dαj = 0 for all other agent j ̸= i. It follows that

dQ =

X ei
k
dαi + k
dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
i∈N ni

Under condition (2), it holds that
X
i∈N

X ei
X ei
ei
e1
en
dQNi = dQN1 + . . . + dQNn =
dq1 + . . . +
dqn = vdQ
ni
n1
nn
i∈N1 ni
i∈Nn ni

where 0 < v < 1. Thus,
dQ = σi dαi
where
σi =

k
> 0.
(1 − kv)(βi + γi + δi )

Proof of Proposition 3. Totally diﬀerentiating i’s best-response function (while keeping
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dαi = dγi = dδi = dni = 0) yields
−(αi − γi Q−i + δi Q̄i )
γi
δi /ni
dβi −
dQ−i +
dQNi
2
(βi + 2γi + δi )
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
−qi∗
γi
δi /ni
=
dβi −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
−qi∗
γi
δi /ni
=
dβi −
dQ +
dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
−qi∗
γi
ei
=
dβi −
dQ + dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni

dqi =

Then, summing across all i yields
(

−qi∗
γi
ei
dQ =
dβi −
dQ + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi +)δi
ni
i∈N (
∗
X
−qi
ei
= k
dβi + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N
X

where
k = 1+

X
i∈N

γi
βi + γi + δi

)

!−1

∈ (0, 1).

Let dβi ̸= 0 for one agent i and dβj = 0 for all other agent j ̸= i. The rest of the proof
follows the same lines as that of Proposition 2. Hence,
dQ = −σi qi∗ dβi

where
σi =

k
> 0.
(1 − kv)(βi + γi + δi )

Proof of Proposition 4. Totally diﬀerentiating i’s best-response function (while keeping
dαi = dβi = dδi = dni = 0) yields

dqi =
=
=
=

−Q∗−i (βi + 2γi + δi ) − 2(αi − γi Q∗−i + δi Q̄∗i )
δi /ni
γi
dQ−i +
dQNi
dγi −
2
(βi + 2γi + δi )
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
−Q∗−i − 2qi∗
γi
δi /ni
dγi −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
∗
∗
−Q − qi
γi
δi /ni
dγi −
dQ +
dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
∗
∗
−Q − qi
γi
ei
dγi −
dQ + dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni
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Then, summing across all i yields
(

−Q∗ − qi∗
γi
ei
dQ =
dγi −
dQ + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi +)δi
ni
i∈N (
∗
∗
X
ei
−Q − qi
= k
dγi + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N
X

where
k = 1+

X
i∈N

γi
βi + γi + δi

)

!−1

∈ (0, 1).

Let dγi ̸= 0 for one agent i and dγj = 0 for all other agent j ̸= i. The rest of the proof
follows the same lines as that of Proposition 2. Hence,
dQ = −σi (Q∗ + qi∗ ) dγi

where
σi =

k
> 0.
(1 − kv)(βi + γi + δi )

Proof of Proposition 5. Totally diﬀerentiating i’s best-response function (while keeping
dαi = dβi = dγi = dni = 0) yields
Q̄∗i (βi + 2γi + δi ) − (αi − γi Q∗−i + δi Q̄∗i )
δi /ni
γi
dQ
+
dQNi
dδ
−
i
−i
(βi + 2γi + δi )2
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
Q̄∗i − qi∗
γi
δi /ni
=
dδi −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
Q̄∗i − qi∗
γi
δi /ni
=
dδi −
dQ +
dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
Q̄∗i − qi∗
γi
ei
=
dδi −
dQ + dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni

dqi =

Then, summing across all i yields
(

γi
ei
Q̄∗i − qi∗
dQ =
dδi −
dQ + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N (
)
∗
∗
X
Q̄i − qi
ei
= k
dδi + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N
X
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where
k = 1+

X
i∈N

γi
βi + γi + δi

!−1

∈ (0, 1).

Let dδi ̸= 0 for one agent i and dδj = 0 for all other agent j ̸= i. The rest of the proof
follows the same lines as that of Proposition 2. Hence,




dQ = σi Q̄∗ − qi∗ dδi

where
σi =

k
> 0.
(1 − kv)(βi + γi + δi )

Proof of Proposition 6. Totally diﬀerentiating i’s best-response function (while keeping
dαi = dβi = dγi = dδi = 0) yields
−δi Q∗Ni /(ni )2
γi
δi /ni
dni −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
−δi Q̄∗Ni /ni
γi
δi /ni
=
dni −
dQ−i +
dQNi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
βi + 2γi + δi
−δi Q̄∗Ni /ni
γi
δi /ni
=
dni −
dQ +
dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
−δi Q̄∗Ni /ni
γi
ei
=
dni −
dQ + dQNi .
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni

dqi =

Then, summing across all i yields
(

−δi Q̄∗Ni /ni
γi
ei
dQ =
dni −
dQ + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N (
)
∗
X −δi Q̄N /ni
ei
i
= k
dni + dQNi
βi + γi + δi
ni
i∈N
X

where
k = 1+

X
i∈N

γi
βi + γi + δi

)

!−1

∈ (0, 1).

Let dni = dnj = ±1 for two agents i and j, and dδk = 0 for all other agent k ̸= i, j. The
rest of the proof follows the same lines as that of Proposition 2. Hence,
ei ∗
ej
dQ = −σ
Q̄i dni + Q̄∗j dnj
ni
nj
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where
σ=

k
> 0.
1 − kv

Proof of Proposition 7. Part 1. Since qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the ﬁrst order condition
of total welfare maximization with respect to qi is given by



X
X δk 
∂W
qk − Q̄k = 0.
= αi − βi qi − γi (qi + Q) − δi qi − Q̄i −
γj qj +
∂qi
k∈Ni nk
j∈N \{i}

Hence, it holds that

qi =

P

αi − γi Q−i + δi Q̄i −

j̸=i γj qj +

P

δk
k∈Ni nk



qk − Q̄k

βi + 2γi + δi



for all i ∈ N.

Let Ni2 = {k ∈ N such that k ∈ Nj for all j ∈ Ni , k ̸= i} denote the set of neighbours
(except i) of i’s neighbours. Then, in matrix notation, it holds that

q = a − Bq + Cq − Nq

where N = [ηi,j ]n×n is such that
 P
δk


k∈Ni (nk )2





βi + 2γi +P
δi



δj
δk


+
γ
−
j

k∈Ni ∩Nj (nk )2
nj





βi + 2γi + δi



δj

ηi,j = 





















γj −

for i = j
for i ̸= j s.t. j ∈ Ni and j ∈ Ni2

nj

βi + 2γ
P i + δi
γj + k∈Ni ∩Nj

for i ̸= j s.t. j ∈ Ni and j ∈
/ Ni2
δk
(nk )2

for i ̸= j s.t. j ∈
/ Ni and j ∈ Ni2

βi + 2γi + δi
γj
βi + 2γi + δi

for i ̸= j s.t. j ∈
/ Ni and j ∈
/ Ni2 .

Part 2. Comparing the equilibrium proﬁle (Fact 1) to the socially optimal proﬁle (Part 1
above), we ﬁnd that q∗ = qo if and only if the following condition holds:
Nq∗ = 0.
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Using Fact 1, this is equivalent to
N [I − (C − B)]−1 a = 0.

Proof of Fact 2. Since qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the ﬁrst order conditions of total welfare
maximization yield
q = a − Bq + Cq − Nq ⇐⇒ qo = [I − (C − B) + N]−1 a.

Proof of Proposition 8. In equilibrium, the ﬁrst order conditions are
αi − βi qi∗ − γi (qi∗ + Q∗ ) − δi (qi∗ − Q̄∗i ) = 0 for all i ∈ N,
since qi∗ > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, in matrix notation, we obtain
q∗ = a − Bq∗ + Cq∗ ⇐⇒ [I − (C − B)] q∗ = a.
Moreover, since qio > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n, the ﬁrst order conditions for the eﬃcient proﬁle
are






αi −βi qio −γi (qio + Qo )−δi qio − Q̄oi −

X

γj qjo −

j∈N \{i}

X
k∈Ni




δk  o
qk − Q̄ok  = 0
nk

for all i ∈ N.

Under condition (3) it follows that




αi − βi qio − γi (qio + Qo ) − δi qio − Q̄oi > 0,

for all i ∈ N.

Hence, in matrix notation, we obtain

qo < a − Bqo + Cqo ⇐⇒ [I − (C − B)] qo < a
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Then,
[I − (C − B)] q∗ = a > [I − (C − B)] qo
[I − (C − B)]−1 [I − (C − B)] q∗ > [I − (C − B)]−1 [I − (C − B)] qo
q∗ > qo
Since C > B and ρ(C − B) < 1 , so [I − (C − B)]−1 ≥ I.

Proof of Proposition 9. Let δi < 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n such that the society of agent is
guided by anti-conformism. Suppose that βi + 2γi > −δi

for all i ∈ N . Thus it is

equivalent to βi + 2γi + δi > 0 and consequently, all diagonal entries of M are positive.
The rest of the proof follows the same line at that of Theorem 1.
Calculations of examples for social norms’ measurements
Graph
G1
G2
G3
(qk −qj )2 +(qm −qj )2
(qk −qj )2 +(ql −qj )2 +(qm −qj )2
Q̄j
(qk − ql )2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
(qj −qk ) +(ql −qk )
(qj −qk ) +(ql −qk ) +(qm −qk )
(qj −qk )2 +(ql −qk )2
Q̄k
2
3
2
(qk −ql )2 +(qj −ql )2 +(qm −ql )2
(qk −ql )2 +(qm −ql )2
(qk −ql )2 +(qm −ql )2
Q̄l
2
3
2
(qj −qm )2 +(ql −qm )2
(qj −qm )2 +(ql −qm )2 +(ql −qm )2
Q¯m
(q
−
qm )2
l
2
3
Graph
G4
G5
(qk −qj )2 +(qm −qj )2
(qk −qj )2 +(ql −qj )2 +(qm −qj )2
Q̄j
2
3
(qj −qk )2 +(qm −qk )2
Q̄k
(q
−
qk )2
j
2
Q̄l
(qm − ql )2
(qj − ql )2
2
2
2
(qj −qm ) +(ql −qm ) +(ql −qm )
Q¯m
(qj − qm )2
3
Table 2: Variance norms with 4 agents

Graph
Q̄j
Q̄k
Q̄l
Q¯m

G1

G2

G3

G4

G5

2qk +2qm
4
2qj +2ql
4
2qk +2qm
4
2qj +2ql
4

3qk +3ql +3qm
9
3qj +3ql +3qm
9
3qj +3qk +3qm
9
3qj +3qk +3ql
9

2qk
2
qj +2ql
3
2qk +qm
3
2ql
2

2qk +3qm
5
2qj +3qm
5
3qm
3
2qj +2qk +ql
5

qk +ql +qm
3
3qj
3
3qj
3
3qj
3

Table 3: Strength of weak ties with 4 agents
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Graph
Q̄j
Q̄k
Q̄l
Q¯m

All graphs
qk δk +ql δl +qm δm
δk +δl +δm
qj δj +ql δl +qm δm
δj +δl +δm
qj δj +qk δk +qm δm
δj +δk +δm
qj δj +qk δk +ql δl
δj +δk +δl

Table 4: Closeness norm with 4 agents
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